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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
RICKY BILLSIE, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
• • - • • •• • * • 
CaseNo.20030066-CA 
• • • • • • • ' • • -
ARGUMENT 
L THE TRIAL COURT CREATED AN INHERENTLY PREJUDICIAL 
SITUATION BY PLACING A SCREENING BARRIER IN FRONT 
OF BILLSIE DURING G.B.'S TESTIMONY, WHICH VIOLATED 
BILLSIE'S RIGHT TO CONFRONT HIS ACCUSER AND HIS 
RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL. 
- The State first claims that Billsie failed to preserve his constitutional challenge to 
the trial court placing a screening barrier in front of him thereby violating his right to 
confront his accuser and his right to a fair trial (Br. of App. at 12). The record shows that 
a large portion of the conversation between the parties and the trial court in relation to the 
placement of the screening barrier was not preserved in the record (R. 155: 84, 92-95). 
A close reading of the record, however, further shows that Billsie did in fact object 
to the placement of the screening barrier and repeatedly requested a hearing on the matter 
in order to determine if such a barrier was necessary (R. 155: 84, 92-95). Although the 
record omits the conference regarding the placement of the screening barrier, the trial 
court later disclosed in the record that it previously ordered a screening barrier placed 
1 
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between G.B. and Billsie (R. 155: 95). Unfortunately, the record does not contain 
Billsie's objections at the time the screening barrier was set up (R. 155: 84, 92-95). 
However, only a few minutes after the screening barrier was set up, Billsie's defense 
counsel again objected to this situation, referencing Billsie's right to confrontation and 
the necessity of the screening barrier, and made the statement, "Again, we have to have a 
hearing on it, your honor, I think." (R. 155: 94). The statement "again" shows that Billsie 
previously requested a hearing regarding the necessity of the screening barrier.1 
The State next claims that the trial court did not plainly err by erecting a screening 
barrier that blocked the "direct line of sight between defendant and the victim," or at least 
this error was not "obvious" to the trial court (Br. of App. at 16). The State further 
claims that "Under the unique circumstances of this case, the requisite showing of 
1
 The State also erroneously claims that after the recess, G.B. again denied the rape 
allegations and then the trial court ordered the screening barrier to be erected (Br. of App. 
at 13, n7). That claim is incorrect. Directly after the recess, G.B. was not asked whether 
Billsie raped her and she did not deny that Billsie raped her (R. 155: 91-92). Instead, the 
prosecutor asked G.B. whether Billsie had touched her under her clothes with his hand or 
some other body part (R. 155: 91). The prosecutor then attempted to ask G.B. about a 
pretrial conversation "about Rick putting his private in your private" and Billsie 
immediately objected (R. 155: 92). Following this objection, the trial court explained on 
the record that it had previously ordered the screening barrier to be erected during the last 
recess (R. 155:95). 
The State also claims that during the recess, G.B. "'broke down' crying and told 
her mother and the prosecutor that she felt scared because defendant was staring at her in 
the courtroom" (Br. of App. at 13). However, at no point did G.B. testify that she was 
scared of Billsie. Instead, after the screening barrier was in place, the prosecutor 
specifically asked G.B., "Now, before we took a break, you weren't able to tell us about 
that (rape allegations).... Can you tell us why it was hard for you to tell us that?" (R. 155: 
102). G.B. responded, "Because [Billsie] was looking at me real sad." (R. 155: 102). 
Moreover, defense counsel argued to the trial court that G.B. did not appear afraid (R. 
155:94). 
2 
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necessity was properly made without resorting to an evidentiary hearing" (Br. of App. at 
18). Billsie asserts that it was plain error to erect a screening barrier violating his 
constitutional right to face his accuser. 
Billsie asserts that the State's heavy reliance on Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 
110 S.Ct. 31.57, 111 L.Ed.2d666 (1990), is misplaced. Craig dealt with the necessity of 
making specific factual findings regarding the use of a one-way closed circuit television 
procedure where the accusers were questioned outside of the presence of the defendant. 
497 U.S. at 842. In Craig, the trial court heard expert testimony that the child sexual 
abuse victims would not be able to testify in the presence of the defendant. Id. 
Specifically, the experts' testimony was summarized as the following: 
The expert testimony in each case suggested that each child would have some or 
considerable difficulty in testifying in Craig's presence. For example, as to one 
child, the expert said that what 'would cause him the most anxiety would be to 
testify in front of Mrs. Craig....' The child 'wouldn't be able to communicate 
effectively.' As to another, an expert said she 'would probably stop talking and 
she would withdraw and curl up.' With respect to two others, the testimony was 
that one would 'become highly agitated, that he may refuse to talk or if he did talk, 
that he would choose his subject regardless of the questions' while the other would 
'become extremely timid and unwilling to talk.' 
Id. 
The distinction between Craig and Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 108 S.Ct. 2798, 
101 L.Ed.2d 857 (1988), is that the trial court in Craig made "case-specific" findings 
3 
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based upon expert testimony that a one-way closed circuit television was necessary to 
protect the welfare of the child witnesses; whereas in Coy, the United States Supreme 
Court rejected the State's assertion that the defendant's confrontation right was 
outweighed by the necessity of protecting minor victims of sexual abuse and the 
presumption of trauma, since there were no findings supporting the assertion. Coy, 487 
U.S. at 1020-21. 
In Craig, the United States Supreme Court held that the trial court had to "hear 
evidence and determine whether the use of the one-way closed circuit television 
procedure is necessary to protect the welfare of the particular child witness...." Craig, 
497 U.S. at 856. The trial court must also find that the "child witness would be 
traumatized, not by the courtroom generally, but by the presence of the defendant." Id. 
And finally, "the trial court must find that the emotional distress suffered by the child 
witness in the presence of the defendant is more than de minimus, i.e., more than 'mere 
nervousness or excitement or some reluctance to testify.5" Id. (citations omitted). 
In Coy, the United States Supreme Court specifically rejected the use of a 
screening barrier between the defendant and the accusing minor witnesses even though 
the State argued that it was necessary to protect the minor victims from trauma. Coy, 487 
U.S. at 1020-21. The Court observed that the trial court made "no individualized 
findings that these particular witnesses needed special protection" and concluded that the 
defendant's right to confront his accusers had been violated. Id. at 1021. 
The State admits that "a generalized concern to protect minor victims does not 
alone justify limitations on confrontation" and that "a 'case specific finding of necessity' 
4 
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is required" (Br. of App. at 17, citing Craig, 497 U.S. at 852-53, 858 (1990)). However, 
Billsie asserts that the trial court made no case specific findings which supported the use 
of a screening barrier in this matter. Instead trial court merely stated: 
The court, after having been informed of the concerns of counsel regarding 
the breakdown of this witness leaving the courtroom, instructed the bailiff to place 
the large podium on counsel table blocking the line of sight between the witness 
and Mr. Billsie.... 
We already have the record of witness' responses when Mr. Billsie was 
watching her and she was watching him. We will see if there is any great 
difference between the setting and what we now have where there is a line of sight 
blockage between the two. 
(R. 155: 95). Thus, the trial court was basically concerned with whether G.B. would 
change her testimony. The trial court did not discuss G.B.'s alleged breakdown or the 
need to protect her from severe emotional distress caused by a further confrontation with 
Billsie. It is evident that the trial court was only concerned with whether G.B.'s 
testimony would change. 
The State claims that Billsie admitted to staring at G.B. during trial (Br. of App. at 
16, n.9). Billsie disagrees with this claim. Billsie stated at the sentencing hearing that 
G.B. was not afraid of him, and that at trial, G.B. attempted to "rush over" and talk to him 
but others prevented her (R. 157: 7). Billsie also stated that while "sitting in the court," 
G.B. was not scared of him but instead, "I look at her, she's sitting over there and she 
smiles. And we had eye contact. And we looked at each other. And she smiled." (R. 
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157: 7). There is no evidence whatsoever that Billsie was staring at G.B. with malicious 
intent or with any intent to scare her. Moreover, at sentencing Billsie expressly denied 
staring at G.B. during trial (R. 157: 7-8). 
Additionally, the State further misrepresents the factual record claiming that G.B. 
feared Billsie because Billsie's "own witness subsequently testified that, even prior to 
trial, the victim expressed fear of the defendant and the victim verified that she was afraid 
of seeing defendant in court" (Br. of App. at 19, n.12 (citing R. 156: 194-95, 254)). 
However, Tillihash testified that G.B. was scared of her own father, Dean Billsie; not 
Ricky Billsie the defendant and appellant (R.156: 194-95). Furthermore, G.B. only 
testified that she did not want to see Billsie at court (R. 156: 254). G.B. did not, 
however, testify why she did not want to see Billsie. 
And finally, Billsie contends that the State's assertion that the trial court's error 
did not deny Billsie a fair trial is erroneous (Br. of App. at 20). The screening barrier 
impermissibly impressed upon the minds of the jurors near the outset of the trial that 
Billsie could not be trusted, that he was a danger to G.B., and that he was guilty. This 
effectively eroded the presumption of innocence and biased the jury against Billsie. 
Moreover, there was not a shred of physical evidence to support the allegations 
against Billsie. Thus, the sole issue before the jury was the credibility of Billsie versus 
G.B. Billsie asserts that the screening barrier impermissible implied that he was guilty 
and untrustworthy, thereby making his testimony less credible in the minds of the jury 
and causing the jury to believe G.B. over Billsie even though there was no supporting 
6 
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physical evidence of a crime. Accordingly, the trial court denied Billsie his right to a fair 
trial. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT IGNORED RULE 615 BY NOT EXCLUDING 
URSULA BILLSIE DURING EXAMINATION OF G.B. AT 
DEFENSE'S REQUEST, THUS PREJUDICING BILLSIE AND 
DENYING HIM A FAIR TRIAL 
The State also claims that the trial court properly exercised its discretion to allow 
G.B.'s mother to remain in the courtroom after Billsie invoked the exclusionary rule 
pursuant to Rule 615 of the Utah Rules of Evidence (Br. of App. at 21). The claim is 
without merit. 
The State concedes that Rule 615 "mandates exclusion of witnesses if requested" 
(Br. of App. at 22). The only exceptions are clearly outlined in Rule 615, and G.B.'s 
mother did not fall into one of those distinguished categories. However, the State claims 
that Ursula Billsie fit under the Rule 615(1 )(c) exception, being "a person whose 
presence is shown by a party to be essential to the presentation of the party's cause." (Br. 
of App. at 22, quoting Rule 615(l)(c)). Billsie maintains that the State made no showing 
that Ursula Billsie's presence was essential to their case nor did the trial court make 
sufficient findings that she fit within one of the exceptions. 
The State appropriately points out that "a witness of tender years may be 
accompanied by an adult" in court (Br. of App. at 23, citing State v. Harrison, 2001 UT 
33, f7, 24 P.3d 936). However, the language of Rule 615 mandates the trial court "shall 
order witnesses excluded" "at the request of a party" and only allows a witness to remain 
7 
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for special, specific reasons. The State cannot cite to any portion of the record where the 
State argued that Ursula Billsie fit within one of these exceptions. In fact, the State made 
no claim that she was essential to their case. 
And while the State claims "the trial court articulated its reasons for granting the 
request," the trial court in fact did not articulate sufficient reasons pursuant to Rule 615 
(Br. of App. at 24). Rule 615 is designed to ensure that witnesses are not tainted or 
influenced by other witnesses at trial. See Astill v. Clark, 956 P.2d 1081, 1087 (Utah App. 
1988). Billsie's theory of the case hinged on evidence that Ursulla Billsie coerced G.B. 
into accusing him of the charges (R. 155: 119). However, the trial court failed to 
consider how this might affect G.B.'s testimony and only considered the fact that G.B. 
was of "tender years" (R. 155: 120). Thus, Billsie asserts that the trial court's hasty 
reasoning for allowing Ursula to remain was insufficient for Rule 615 purposes. 
The State further claims "there is no basis from which to conclude that the mother 
conformed her testimony to that of the child, or that the child changed her testimony 
based on the mother's presence" (Br. of App. at 26). However, the opposite is true. 
Allowing Ursula Billsie to remain in the courtroom improperly influenced G.B. and 
thereby denied Billsie his right to a fair trial. Although it is impossible to appraise the 
exact taint or influence Ursula Billsie had on G.B., the record shows that G.B. did in fact 
change her testimony when the screening barrier was erected in front of Billsie, allowing 
only a direct line of sight between G.B. and Ursula, and completely blocking the line of 
sight between G.B. and Billsie (R. 155: 94-95, 96-97). 
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III. THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO GRANT A MISTRIAL DUE 
TO PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT DURING CLOSING 
ARGUMENT PREJUDICED BILLSIE AND THE IMPROPER 
COMMENTS WERE HARMFUL. 
Billsie relies upon the assertions stated in his original brief. 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
For the foregoing reasons and the reasons stated in the original brief, Billsie asks 
this Court to reverse his convictions and remand the matter to the trial court for further 
proceedings. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 16th day of January, 2004. 
Margaret P. tindsay (j 
Counsel for Appellant 
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